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PREJUDICE, CONSTITUTIONAL MORAL
PROGRESS, AND BEING “ON THE RIGHT SIDE
OF HISTORY”: REFLECTIONS ON
LOVING V. VIRGINIA AT FIFTY
Linda C. McClain*
Too many times in our history, our citizens have had to lead the way on
civil rights while their leaders stood against them . . . . It is time for the
[C]ommonwealth [of Virginia] to be on the right side of history and the
right side of the law.
—Virginia Attorney General Mark Gerring1

INTRODUCTION
Loving v. Virginia2 is a landmark civil rights case that struck down the last
relic of state-enforced racial segregation (antimiscegenation laws) as an
unconstitutional “endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.”3 Fifty
years later, this Symposium also reminds us of the poignant human story
giving rise to Mildred and Richard Loving’s successful constitutional

* Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
I am grateful to Professor Tanya Hernández and the Fordham Law Review for including me
in the Symposium entitled Fifty Years of Loving v. Virginia and the Continued Pursuit of
Racial Equality. For an overview of the Symposium, see R.A. Lenhardt, Tanya K. Hernández
& Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword: Fifty Years of Loving v. Virginia and the Continued Pursuit
of Racial Equality, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2625 (2018). Thanks to the Symposium participants
for valuable conversations; thanks, in particular, to Jonathan Kahn for commenting on an
earlier draft. This Article draws on my forthcoming book, Bigotry, Conscience, and Marriage:
Past and Present Controversies (under contract with Oxford University Press).
1. Timothy Williams & Trip Gabriel, Virginia’s New Attorney General Opposes Ban on
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/newvirginia-attorney-general-drops-defense-of-gay-marriage-ban.html [https://perma.cc/3QS8-C
GCC] (quoting Virginia’s Attorney General Mark Herring’s criticism of his predecessor’s
defense of Virginia’s antimiscegenation law in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and
explanation of his decision not to defend Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage in federal
court).
2. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. Id. at 17 (characterizing the “reasons” given in Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va.
1955), on which the Supreme Court of Virginia relied in Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d
78, 80 (Va. 1966)); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Loving v. Virginia as a Civil Rights Decision,
59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 175, 177 (2014) (criticizing the argument that Loving does not deserve
“a central place in the civil rights canon” (quoting 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 291 (2014))).
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challenge.4 Loving remains a foundational case on the limits on
governmental authority to regulate marriage and the family.5
No U.S. Supreme Court case has proven more central to the constitutional
battle over same-sex marriage than Loving. In Obergefell v. Hodges,6 the
case in which the Court held that the fundamental right to marry extends to
same-sex couples, the majority drew on Loving repeatedly to support its
reasoning.7 Loving features in controversies over whether state laws
protecting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons from
discrimination in public accommodations and other areas of civic life violate
the First Amendment rights of those with conscientious or religious
objections to same-sex marriage. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission,8 for example, baker Jack Phillips and his amici
seek to distinguish the “bigotry” and odious racism behind antimiscegenation
laws from Phillips’s sincere, “decent and honorable” religious convictions
about marriage.9 Defenders of state antidiscrimination laws, in response,
enlist Loving to show that discrimination “justified” by history, tradition, or
religious motivation, however sincere, should not prevail.10
This Article argues that Loving illustrates a theme of generational moral
progress in our constitutional jurisprudence: laws once justified by appeals
to nature, God’s law and plan for the races, and the well-being of children
and society are now repudiated as rooted in prejudice. In Obergefell, Justice
Kennedy stated that “[t]he nature of injustice is that we may not always see
it in our own times”; “new insight[s] reveal[] discord between the
Constitution’s [commitments and] . . . received legal stricture[s].”11 Thus,
with such insight, the Court struck down antimiscegenation laws in Loving
and “invidious” laws embodying gender hierarchy in marriage.12 As Justice
Ginsburg wrote in United States v. Virginia (VMI),13 “the history of our
Constitution . . . is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and

4. This Symposium included a panel with the director of the HBO documentary, The
Loving Story. For more on the Lovings’ story, see PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I
LOVE MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW—AN AMERICAN HISTORY 215 (2002).
5. See generally John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving,
51 HOW. L.J. 15 (2007).
6. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
7. Id. at 2598–99, 2602–04 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12). But cf. Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2619 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (rejecting this reliance because Loving removed racial
barriers to marriage but did not change the “core definition of marriage as the union of a man
and a woman”).
8. No. 16-111 (U.S. argued Dec. 5, 2017).
9. The Court is hearing Phillips’s appeal from the ruling against him in Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.,
No. 16-111; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D. et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 26, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., No. 16-111, 2017 WL 4004529, at *37 (quoting
reference to “decent and honorable” in the Obergefell majority opinion).
10. See Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 28–30 & n.9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., No. 16-111,
2017 WL 4998227, at *28–30 & n.9.
11. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
12. Id. at 2603–04.
13. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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protections to people once ignored or excluded.”14 This moral reading of the
Constitution interprets its guarantees of liberty and equality as reflecting
commitments to “abstract aspirational principles” that we seek to realize over
time.15 In interpreting or constructing the Constitution, we aim to redeem
those promises.16
Looking back at the record in Loving, this Article shows the role played by
narratives of constitutional moral progress, in which the Lovings and their
amici indicted Virginia’s antimiscegenation law as an “odious” relic of
slavery and a present-day reflection of racial prejudice.17 In response,
Virginia sought to distance such laws from prejudice and white supremacy
by appealing to “the most recent” social science that identified problems
posed by “intermarriage,” particularly for children.18 Such work also
rejected the idea that intermarriage was a path toward progress and freedom
from prejudice.19 This Article concludes by briefly examining the appeal to
Loving in arguments about not being on “the wrong side of history” in the
successful challenge to Virginia’s bans on permitting or recognizing samesex marriage.
I. PREJUDICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL MORAL PROGRESS:
ARGUMENTS IN LOVING
The Court’s opinion in Loving shows traces of Virginia’s various
rationales for its antimiscegenation laws. Chief Justice Earl Warren quotes,
without comment, the trial court’s famous theological justification:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and
he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with
his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that
he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.20

Appeals to scripture to defend antimiscegenation law and oppose any form
of racial integration had long been a staple in judicial opinions and political
rhetoric.21
14. Id. at 557.
15. See JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL
READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS 4 (2015).
16. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 5–6 (2011) (introducing the idea of redemption of the Constitution’s promises).
17. See infra Part III.
18. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–29, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No.
395), reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 959, 986–87 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1975).
19. Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 7–9, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 395),
reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 789, 800–02 [hereinafter Brief of Appellee].
Cites to the record are from this Kurland and Casper volume, with the exception of citations
to appendicies to the appellee’s brief, which are available at 1967 WL 93641.
20. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1, 3 (quoting Loving v. Commonwealth (Va. Cir. Ct. Caroline
Cty. Jan. 22, 1965)).
21. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 78 (N.M. 2013) (Bosson,
J., concurring) (“Whatever opinion one might have of the [Loving] trial judge’s religious
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The Court also quotes from Naim v. Naim,22 on which the Virginia
Supreme Court relied in its Loving opinion.23 Naim asserts that an “unbroken
line of decisions”—with the exception of the California case Perez v.
Lippold24—does not read the Fourteenth Amendment as denying states the
power to regulate marriage to prevent “the corruption of blood” and a
“mongrel breed of citizens” that would “weaken or destroy the quality of its
citizenship.”25 Warren described these supposed “legitimate purposes” as
“obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy” and
concluded that “no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious
racial discrimination” justified Virginia’s antimiscegenation law.26 In
addition to this Equal Protection Clause holding, the Court held that the law
violated the Due Process Clause by restricting the fundamental right to marry
by means of invidious racial discrimination.27
These holdings made it unnecessary for the Court to engage with
Virginia’s more “modern” argument that, because “the scientific evidence is
substantially in doubt” as to “whether there was any rational basis for a State
to treat interracial marriages differently from other marriages,” the Court
“should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of
discouraging interracial marriage[].”28 The Lovings and their amici
countered that antimiscegenation laws reflected and perpetuated racial
prejudice.29 This tension demonstrates how Virginia attempted to escape the
racist origins and purposes of its antimiscegenation law by recasting it as a
legitimate way to deal with the psychological and sociological problems
arising from interracial marriage.
II. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF VIRGINIA’S ANTIMISCEGENATION LAW
This Part discusses how Virginia attempted to offer an alternative,
scientific argument against interracial marriage by drawing on sociological
concerns about the supposed effects of interracial marriage on marital success
and child well being. In doing so, this Part illustrates how Virginia
analogized interracial marriage to other “problematic” marriages that the
state could bar while ignoring how its “scientific” evidence also applied to
legally permitted marriages, such as interfaith marriage.
views, which mirrored those of millions of Americans at the time, no one questioned his
sincerity either or his religious conviction.”).
22. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955).
23. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.
24. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
25. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 756.
26. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7, 11 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 12.
28. Id. at 8. The Court rejected Virginia’s “equal application” argument in light of its
prior invalidation of Florida’s law punishing interracial cohabitation more harshly than
intraracial cohabitation as “invidious discrimination” prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 10. In McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), the Court rejected
Florida’s reliance on Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), for the argument that the statute
was lawful because it applied equally to those who committed the intraracial offense.
McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188.
29. See infra Part III.A.
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A. Not Racial Prejudice, but Preventing Problem
Marriages Doomed by “Difference”
In Loving, Virginia argued that its antimiscegenation law did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment because the framers intended to exclude such
laws from its terms; thus, the Court should not inquire into “the wisdom,
propriety or desirability of preventing interracial alliances.”30 Alternatively,
Virginia argued that “if the Fourteenth Amendment [is] deemed to apply to
state antimiscegenation statutes, then this statute serves [the] legitimate
legislative objective of preventing the sociological and psychological evils
[that] attend interracial marriage.”31 Specifically, Virginia relied on Rabbi
Albert I. Gordon’s 1964 book Intermarriage: Interfaith, Interracial,
Interethnic as “the most recent scientific treatise upon the propriety or
desirability of interracial marriages from the psychological and sociological
point of view.”32
Virginia attempted to recast its antimiscegenation law as rooted not in
racial prejudice and white supremacy but on “today’s evidence” about the
detrimental “psychological aspects” of intermarriage.33 During oral
argument, the Justices repeatedly asked Assistant Attorney General Robert
McIlwaine whether Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act was anything other than
“the result of the old slavery days, the old feeling that the white man was
superior to the colored man, which was exactly what the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted to prevent.”34 McIlwaine conceded that the Act,
as a whole, rested on a premise of white superiority, but he urged that the
issue should be restricted to whether the two specific provisions in question
were justifiable in 1967.35 That contemporary justification, he contended,
citing Gordon’s book as principal authority, stemmed from the psychological
and sociological problems such marriages posed.36
Virginia, however, used Gordon’s book strategically and selectively. It
brushed aside Gordon’s lengthier treatment of—and warnings against—
interfaith marriage. In enlisting Gordon’s book to show that interracial
marriage was especially harmful for children, Virginia left out Gordon’s
reasoning for that argument: that such children are likely to suffer the same
“discriminatory practices,” “indignities,” and complete lack of acceptance by
white society as their parents.37
Virginia related its antimiscegenation law to its “natural, direct, and vital
interest in maximizing the number of successful marriages [that] lead to
stable homes and families, and in minimizing those [that] do not.”38 It

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
(1964).
38.

Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, at 38.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 20.
Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, at 47. Gordon was also a trained sociologist.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 27–28, 33.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 27–28, 33–34.
ALBERT I. GORDON, INTERMARRIAGE: INTERFAITH, INTERRACIAL, INTERETHNIC 334
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 27.
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asserted that “the most recent available evidence on the psycho-sociological
aspect of this question [indicated] that intermarried families are subjected to
much greater pressures and problems than are those of the intramarried”;
thus, its “prohibition of racial intermarriage” stood on “the same footing” as
other restrictions, such as barring polygamous, incestuous, and underage
marriages, and marriages by “people who are mentally incompetent.”39
Virginia enlisted Gordon’s book to give “statistical form and basis to the
proposition that, from a psycho-sociological point of view, interracial
marriages are detrimental to the individual, to the family, and to the
society.”40
Virginia also enlisted Gordon to deflect charges of racial prejudice. It
quoted Gordon’s rejection of “the argument that persons who oppose
intermarriage—religious or racial—are per se prejudiced” and his retort that
“the tendency to classify all persons who oppose intermarriage as
‘prejudiced’ is, in itself, a prejudice.”41 While some people’s opposition may
rest in “prejudice,” Gordon acknowledged “the desire to perpetuate one’s
own religion [and] to prevent its assimilation [as] understandable and
reasonable”; “neither races of man nor religious or ethnic groups need offer
apologies for their desire to perpetuate themselves.”42 Citing Gordon,
McIlwaine attempted to recast Virginia’s law as being not about “racial
superiority or inferiority” but simply racial difference,43 and he argued that
children of the intermarried are harmed by such “difference” in marriage44
and that higher divorce rates arise from such difference.45
Virginia’s brief included numerous passages from Gordon about the
importance of “like marrying like” as a formula for marital happiness and
divorce prevention.46 But Gordon applied that formula to religion as well.47
At oral argument, Chief Justice Warren observed that some people have “the
same feeling about interreligious marriages”—that intermarried families face
(in McIlwaine’s words) “greater pressures and problems than . . . the
intramarried”—and asked whether the state could also prohibit interreligious
marriage for that reason.48 Warren’s observation and question echoed an
observation made nearly twenty years earlier, in Perez v. Lippold, when the
Supreme Court of California struck down California’s antimiscegenation
law: “If miscegenous marriages can be prohibited because of tensions
suffered by the progeny, mixed religious unions could be prohibited on the

39. Id. at 27–28.
40. Id. at 28. Gordon disavowed any reliance on a biological argument in his tallying of
the costs of intermarriage. GORDON, supra note 37, at 220–21.
41. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, at 48 (emphasis added) (quoting GORDON, supra
note 37, at 357).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 44.
44. Id.
45. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 44.
46. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 348–
49, 354).
47. Id. (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 367–69).
48. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 28.

2018]

CONSTITUTIONAL MORAL PROGRESS

2707

same ground.”49 McIlwaine responded, “I think that the evidence in support
of the prohibition of interracial marriages is stronger than that for the
prohibition of interreligious marriages . . . .”50 When questioned about the
basis for his statement, he rested “particularly” on Gordon’s book.51
Gordon’s book, however, does not support singling out interracial
marriage for legal prohibition. He devotes far more of his book to interfaith
(interreligious) marriage.52 The book’s criticism of both forms of
“intermarriage” is clear even from the passages Virginia quoted in its brief.
For example, Gordon warns that “intermarriage” introduces “major
differences,” whether religious or racial, that make marital success less likely
and divorce more likely than in the “average” marriage:
A rereading of the factual material contained in this study of intermarriage
in its various forms, and of its effects on those who intermarry, leads me to
the conclusion that intermarriage is actually a threat to ultimate happiness,
that the problems that result from the major differences in religion and race
are so weighty as to require that those who would intermarry be persons of
far greater strength and courage than is ordinarily required in marriage. If,
in the average marriage, there are differences that must be resolved and
adjustments that must be made, and if, even then, the divorce rate is about
one in every three marriages, we may expect that the divorce rate for the
intermarried will be much greater.53

Such higher risks of divorce, Gordon argues, support the conclusion that
“intermarriage is unwise for most individuals and must, therefore, be
regarded as a threat to both personal and group happiness.”54 Instead, “the
chances of happiness in marriage are greatest for those who are culturally,
socially, educationally, temperamentally, ethnically, nationally, racially, and
religiously more like than they are different from each other.”55 Interfaith
and interracial marriages, Gordon asserts, pose “a threat to the children of
such” marriages because they “tend to make [children] marginal in their
relationships to parents, their faiths or their races.”56
Gordon rejected the argument that intermarriage, of whatever form, was a
sign of progress. Thus, Virginia quotes Gordon’s emphatic insistence that
there was no evidence that intermarriage might be a path to realizing
“[u]niversal brotherhood, freedom from prejudice, intolerance and hatred of
49. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 26 (Cal. 1948).
50. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 28.
51. Id.
52. Chapters 4 through 7 of Gordon’s book address interfaith marriage. See GORDON,
supra note 37, at 87–219. Two chapters, chapters 8 and 9, address interracial marriage. Id. at
220–94. One short chapter, chapter 10, discusses “Interethnic Marriages.” Id. at 295–309.
Chapter 11, “What of the Children?” contains more narratives about interfaith marriages than
interracial ones. Id. at 310–47.
53. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (second emphasis added) (quoting GORDON,
supra note 37, at 369–70). Gordon mentions evidence that “the rate of divorce in cases of
intermarriage is two to four times as heavy as the ‘normal’ rate.” GORDON, supra note 37, at
370.
54. GORDON, supra note 37, at 369.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 370.
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the unlike.”57 But, once again, Gordon viewed all forms of intermarriage as
“a threat to society and . . . not necessarily a promise of a brighter day to
come.”58 Instead, he insisted, “It is the duty of men and women of different
faiths, colors and nations to learn to live together in peace and amity while
maintaining their differences.”59 Gordon’s pervasive concern, as a Rabbi and
social scientist, was an evident increase in Jewish young people, with more
opportunities for social contact across lines of religion, “interdating” and
intermarrying, disregarding the advice of their elders and even threatening
Jewish survival.60 Throughout his book, however, Gordon, often lumped
together race and religion, as in the following passage Virginia quotes:
“intermarriage appears to the major religious bodies, as well as to national
ethnic and racial groups, to constitute a betrayal of the ideals and values [that]
each professes”; it “betray[s] . . . family and group values” and often creates
“a deep hurt” in “family and friends whose values are spurned.”61
Perhaps Gordon’s book appealed to Virginia’s attorneys because his
appeal to group pride and a duty to preserve difference seemed to echo
defenses of antimiscegenation laws as furthering racial pride—and racial
purity—for both whites and “Negroes.” However, in passages not quoted by
Virginia, Gordon rejects any biological basis for ideas of a “pure” race or of
racial superiority and inferiority; he suggests one can make sense of the
persistence of these ideas only if one sees them as a pretext for prejudice.62
Still, in discussing controls on intermarriage, Gordon matter-of-factly reports
that antimiscegenation laws exist in “over half of the states in the Union”
“[u]nder the impression that the preservation of our society depends upon
such methods.”63 Disturbingly, he takes no normative position on such
laws.64
B. Why Are Interracial Marriages Problem Marriages?
Virginia deployed Gordon’s book strategically to argue that interracial
marriage causes children to suffer but ignored the role of racial prejudice in
causing that suffering. At oral argument, the Court pressed McIlwaine on
whether “one reason that marriages of this kind are sometimes unsuccessful
is the existence of the kind of laws that are in issue here, and the attitudes that
those laws reflect.”65 McIlwaine tried to shift from the role of law by quoting
57. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 358–60).
58. GORDON, supra note 37, at 368.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Daniel Levinson, Rabbi’s Study Opposes Intermarriage, BOS. GLOBE, May
5, 1964, at 17 (reviewing GORDON, supra note 37). To put this concern in historical context,
see, e.g., Meir Ben-Horin, Intermarriage and the Survival of the Jewish People, in
INTERMARRIAGE AND JEWISH LIFE: A SYMPOSIUM 38, 42 (Werner J. Cahnman ed., 1963)
(discussing a “consensus” that religious intermarriage was contrary to Judaism and raising
question, “Is intermarriage a significant problem that needs to be discussed vis-à-vis the
survival of the Jewish People?”).
61. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 359).
62. See GORDON, supra note 37, at 220–21.
63. Id. at 66.
64. Id.
65. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 29.
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Gordon’s observation that society’s “attitude . . . toward interracial
marriages . . . ‘causes a child to have almost insuperable difficulties in
identification.’”66 McIlwaine added that “‘the problems [that] the child of an
interracial marriage faces are those which no child can come through without
damages to himself’” given a state interest in “protecting the progeny of
interracial marriages from these problems.”67
A closer look at Gordon reveals that the social “attitudes” causing those
problems are racial prejudice and hostility. Thus, although children of
intermarriage—whether interfaith, interracial, or interethnic—suffer, racial
prejudice makes the children of such marriages particularly “socially
unfortunate.”68 Gordon explains that, in interfaith marriages, because the
household does not share a religion, the couple often experiences difficulties
and children lack a clear identity, lack security, and experience divided
loyalty.69 Turning to the harms to children from interracial marriage, Gordon
is briefer and starker: “The children born of Negro-white marriages in the
United States are, I believe, among the most socially unfortunate persons in
all the world if they seek or expect acceptance by the white community in
America.”70 He also warned that, as teenagers, children will encounter the
general refusal of whites in the United States to allow “interdating.”71 In
language unwittingly mirroring Virginia’s interpretation of its
antimiscegenation law (the “one drop” rule), Gordon takes the baseline of
racial prejudice as a given:
To date there is no evidence that persons with even one drop of Negro blood
will, knowingly, be accepted as whites. . . . He must find his roots within
the Negro community or remain unaccepted and unacceptable to the white
community. It will do no good to argue whether whites are correct in taking
such an attitude. It is far more important to know that, realistically
speaking, this unfortunately is their attitude.72

Even though Gordon published Intermarriage in 1964, as Congress
debated what became the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, he does not
give credence to the possibility of moral progress through civil rights.
Instead, for him, racial prejudice is a moral argument against interracial
marriage. Thus, after detailing the pervasive discrimination against “the
Negro in the United States,” Gordon asserts:
Unless a miracle occurs that will eliminate discrimination from our
society—and that does not seem probable—we may expect such children

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 29 (quoting GORDON, supra note 37).
Id. at 29–30 (quoting GORDON, supra note 37).
GORDON, supra note 37, at 333.
Id. at 87–118, 310–47; see, e.g., JAMES H.S. BOSSARD & ELEANOR STOKER BALL, ONE
MARRIAGE, TWO FAITHS: GUIDANCE ON INTERFAITH MARRIAGE 126–28 (1957) (discussing
how children without “unicultural training” do not benefit by the different cultures but are
rather burdened by the parents’ arguing about the “correct” way to live).
70. GORDON, supra note 37, at 333.
71. Id. at 334.
72. Id. at 333–34.
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[of interracially married parents] to suffer the same indignities as do their
parents.
Whether people, however much they may love each other, have the
moral right to create such a problem for a child is, of course, debatable. It
is my belief that interracially intermarried parents are committing a grave
offense against their children that is far more serious and even dangerous
to their welfare than they realize.73

Omitting the above passage, Virginia’s brief quotes Gordon’s conclusion
that “[t]he chances for the success of an interracial marriage are, according
to my research, even less than for that of an inter-faith marriage.”74 Virginia
also omits the basis for Gordon’s conclusion, that “obvious difference in skin
color makes for an unfavorable societal attitude toward the intermarried”
such that “[p]ersons who entertain the thought of entering into an interracial
marriage should know that they and any children born to them will suffer
many hardships and disadvantages as the result of such a marriage.”75
Gordon asserts, “I believe that the institution of marriage certainly does not
require that we make martyrs of ourselves and of our children.”76
This closer look at Gordon clarifies that, in his view, racial prejudice and
discrimination made interracial marriage particularly fraught with problems.
Without condoning it, Gordon treats such prejudice as a social fact. But he
also offers his “personal view,” which seems to be a pluralistic vision of the
normative good stemming from preserving differences—religious, racial,
and national—rather than eliminating them.77 Virginia quotes this vision:
I believe that basic differences will not be eliminated. . . . [T]he most we
can hope and work for with any degree of moderate success is that we will
grow more accustomed to the idea that it is possible for persons of different
colors, races, nations and religions to work together in many areas even
while retaining their distinctiveness.78

Virginia may have quoted this passage to attempt to hold the line on
dismantling legally compelled racial segregation at marriage after so fiercely
resisting school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education.79 The
context, however, is not legal prohibition of intermarriage but rather
Gordon’s skepticism that “intermarriage”—whether interfaith, interracial, or
interethnic—is the path to greater social harmony and the end of “prejudice,
intolerance, and hatred.”80 Once again, Virginia quotes selectively, omitting
the reason Gordon criticizes the belief that more black-white marriages could
overcome the “race problem,” that “Negroes” still lack “social equality” and,
73. Id. at 334.
74. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 348–49).
75. GORDON, supra note 37, at 349.
76. Id.; cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (“Parents may be free to
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free . . . to make martyrs of their
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves.”).
77. GORDON, supra note 37, at 357–60.
78. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 362).
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. GORDON, supra note 37, at 361.
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although some “Negro and white college youth” may meet and marry, the
present attitude of “the white man to the Negro” is not likely to change for at
least a generation.81 Gordon’s quiescence toward the status quo is in striking
contrast with one of his mentors, social psychologist Gordon W. Allport. In
The Nature of Prejudice, Allport acknowledged that prejudice made
interracial marriage inadvisable under the current conditions, but he also
argued for dismantling legal segregation and working for conditions that
made those marriages possible.82 Allport observed, “It is because
intermarriage would symbolize the abolition of prejudice that it is so
strenuously fought.”83
III. ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE LOVINGS AND THEIR AMICI
The Lovings’ counsel engaged Virginia’s reliance on Gordon only briefly.
At oral argument, Bernard Cohen read the following passage from
Intermarriage: “[O]ur democracy would soon be defeated if any group on
the American scene was required to cut itself off from context with persons
of other religions or races. The segregation of any group, religious or racial,
either voluntarily or involuntarily, is unthinkable and even dangerous to the
body politic.”84 In contrast to Virginia’s selective use of Gordon’s theory to
demonstrate harms to children from interracial marriage, the Lovings and
their amici countered that prejudice created the problems. This Part focuses
on the role, in their arguments, of appeals to constitutional moral progress of
repudiating prejudice and discrimination in light of the gradual realization of
constitutional commitments to equality and liberty.
A. Racial Prejudice and Constitutional Moral Progress
The Lovings urged the Court to take this “appropriate opportunity to strike
down the last remnants of legalized slavery in our country.”85
Antimiscegenation laws were “both relics of slavery and expressions of
modern day racism which brand Negroes as an inferior race.”86
Antimiscegenation laws, the Lovings argued, “are legalized racial prejudice,
unsupported by reason or morals, and should not exist in a good society.”87
This appeal to “morals” and a “good society” is powerful, given the repeated
quoting—in defenses of antimiscegenation laws—of Maynard v. Hill88 and
its notion that marriage has “more to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution.”89 Moral progress requires abandoning
such unsupportable laws.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 364.
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 354–55 (1954).
Id. at 354.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 46.
Brief for Appellants at 1, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 40.
125 U.S. 190 (1888).
Id. at 205.
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The amicus briefs in support of the Lovings similarly linked Virginia’s
laws to racial prejudice and urged their demise as an important measure of
constitutional progress.90 The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
(the “Fund”) asserted that such laws rested on an “amalgam of superstition,
mythology, ignorance and pseudoscientific nonsense summoned up to
support the theories of white supremacy and racial ‘purity.’”91 Further, the
trial court’s appeal to “Almighty God” also illustrated the appeal to theology,
which is not a sufficient rationale under the Fourteenth Amendment to
implement racial discrimination.92
The Lovings’ brief also highlights the interplay of racial prejudice and
white men’s “sore conscience” under the “illicit conditions fostered by the
miscegenation laws”: they quote Gunnar Myrdal on white men’s sexual
exploitation of “the Negro female” and the fixation on “the purity of white
womanhood.”93 They argued that such laws are the “paradigm” of measures
expressing “the subordinate status of the Negro people and the exalted
position of the whites . . . functioning chiefly as the State’s official symbol
of a caste system.”94 They “inflict[] indignity upon every person cast . . . as
not good enough to marry a ‘white person.’”95
The Japanese American Citizens League also situates the striking down of
Virginia’s law within a narrative of moral and constitutional progress by
asserting that “[t]he torchlight of the Constitution has been wielded to expose
and burn away these remaining shackles to individual liberty and to cast forth
light extending “to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to
pursue.”96 The group’s brief debunks ideas of a pure race and of racial
superiority by arguing that Virginia’s law is “readily exposed as a racist,
‘white supremacy’ law.”97 The brief invokes interfaith marriage to condemn
legal bans on interracial marriage: “no one would seriously contend” that
various forms of bans on marriage based on differences—such as “between
Protestants and Catholics . . . would be constitutional.”98 As with religion,
so with race: “Whatever differences may exist between these groups cannot
provide proper bases for fixing public policy.”99

90. See, e.g., Brief of N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae at 9–10, 13, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter Fund Brief] (arguing that
“the laws against interracial marriage grew out of the system of slavery and were based on
race prejudices and notions of Negro inferiority used to justify slavery, and later segregation”).
91. Id. at 9–10 (referring to the mongrelization rhetoric in Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749,
756 (1995)).
92. Id. at 13–14.
93. Brief for Appellants, supra note 85, at 25 (quoting GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 591 (1962)).
94. Id. at 27–28 (quoting GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 66 (1962)).
95. Id. at 27.
96. Brief of Amici Curiae Japanese American Citizens League at 6, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395).
97. Id. at 4.
98. Id. at 30.
99. Id.
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The Fund’s Brief situates invalidating racial prohibitions on marriage as
part of the “never-ending struggle” of the “Negro in the United States” for
“full and equal citizenship” and against “laws, customs, practices, usages and
opinion relegating him to an inferior status.”100 It further invokes the Court’s
striking down of “all other segregation laws” in urging the Court to strike
down the antimiscegenation laws, and it argues that these laws “intrude a
racist dogma into the private and personal relationship of marriage,” which
is inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.101
B. Modern Science, Race Prejudice, and Harms to Children
While Virginia stressed the harms to children born into interracial
marriages as a reason to prohibit such marriages,102 the Lovings stressed the
“immeasurable social harm” (including to children) caused by prohibiting
those marriages, including rendering children illegitimate.103 To show the
absence of any rational basis for Virginia’s law, the Lovings and their amici
enlisted modern scientific understanding of race, particularly the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO)
1952 “Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences,” which found
that “no biological justification exists for prohibiting intermarriage between
persons of different races.”104 Amici argued that Virginia’s rationales about
mongrelization and race mixture (as embraced in Naim) are “abhorrent to”
present day science and jurisprudence.105 Although Chief Justice Warren
asked counsel for Virginia his opinion about the “very cogent findings on the
racist view” in the UNESCO report,106 his opinion “stopped short of refuting
the validity of race as a biological category.”107 But in concluding that the
purpose of Virginia’s law was to “maintain white supremacy,”108 Loving was
the “capstone of the Court’s blow to the Jim Crow regime.”109
In the only amicus brief filed on behalf of the Lovings by religious leaders
and institutions, the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, the
100. Brief of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People as Amicus
Curiae at 1, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter NAACP Brief].
101. Fund Brief, supra note 90, at 14–15.
102. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 27–29; supra Part II.A.
103. Brief of Appellants, supra note 85, at 24.
104. Fund Brief, supra note 90, at 11 (quoting PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGISTS &
GENETICISTS, UNESCO, STATEMENT ON THE NATURE OF RACE AND RACE DIFFERENCES art. 7
(1952)); NAACP Brief, supra note 100, at 9 (same); United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization, Expert Meeting on the Biological Aspects of Race, Statement on
the Nature of Race and Race Differences (Apr. 27, 1964); see also Brief of Appellant, supra
note 85, at 36–37.
105. NAACP Brief, supra note 100, at 6–7.
106. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 30. Virginia’s brief countered this
1951 statement by referring to a subsequent UNESCO “booklet,” see UNESCO, THE RACE
CONCEPT: RESULTS OF AN INQUIRY (1952), discussing objections to its 1951 statement, see
Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. C.
107. Roberts, supra note 3, at 207–08. The Fund Brief urged that, in light of the Court’s
evolving jurisprudence, “racially discriminatory state laws” lack any justification and “are all
invalid per se.” See Fund Brief, supra note 90, at 6.
108. Roberts, supra note 3, at 208.
109. Id. at 176.
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National Catholic Social Action Conference, and several Catholic bishops
and archbishops in southern dioceses (including Richmond, Virginia)
asserted that third parties’ “race prejudice” creates suffering for “parties to
an interracial marriage” and their children—not “anything inherent in the
family structure of the marriage.”110 By contrast to some studies of the
harmful effects of polygamy (to which Virginia compared interracial
marriage), there is no proof that “an interracial marriage, because of the
nature of such a marriage, is likely to engender similar harmful effects.”111
Further, they argued that the government should not allow the racial prejudice
of third persons to justify restrictions on the freedom to marry.112 The brief
quotes Perez v. Sharp113: “it is ‘no answer to say that race tension can be
eradicated through the perpetuation by law of the prejudices that give rise to
the tension.’”114
These briefs provide an important contrast to Virginia’s appeal to “social
attitudes” (i.e., racial prejudice and intolerance of interracial marriage) to
justify perpetuating legalized racial discrimination. They also bring to mind
the Supreme Court’s later statement about racial prejudice in Palmore v.
Sidoti115: “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”116
CONCLUSION
Reflecting on Loving invites questions about when “new insights”
regarding objectionable discrimination and the need to realize better the
Constitution’s promises are possible. When same-sex couples, nearly fifty
years after Loving, challenged Virginia’s defense of marriage laws
(“DOMA”), the Attorney General of Virginia declined to defend the bans and
asserted that he did not want to be “on the wrong side of history.”117 He
criticized his predecessors, who chose to defend racially discriminatory laws
in Loving and Brown and sex-discriminatory laws in VMI.118 Similarly, the
Solicitor General of Virginia argued, in federal district court, that the “legal
principle” of equality was clear in those earlier cases; the problem lay in “the

110. Brief Amicus Curiae, Urging Reversal, On Behalf of John J. Russell, Bishop of
Richmond et al. at 15, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395). This brief also
appealed to “freedom of conscience,” asserting that Virginia’s laws prohibit “the free exercise
of religion,” as well as “the right to beget children.” Id. at 6, 20.
111. Id. at 15.
112. Id. at 17.
113. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
114. Brief Amicus Curiae, Urging Reversal, On Behalf of John J. Russell, Bishop of
Richmond et al., supra note 110, at 17 (quoting Perez, 198 P.2d at 25).
115. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
116. Id. at 433.
117. Eyder Peralta, Virginia’s New Attorney General Will Not Defend Gay Marriage Ban,
NPR (Jan. 23, 2014, 12:17 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/01/23/2650
50444/virginias-new-attorney-general-will-not-defend-gay-marriage-ban [https://perma.cc/
HJ3F-URXL].
118. See Peralta, supra note 117; see also Williams & Gabriel, supra note 1.
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perception about how that principle applied at that time in history.”119 The
federal district court judge that found Virginia’s DOMA unconstitutional
opened her opinion with Mildred Loving’s reference, on the fortieth
anniversary of Loving, to generational progress: she noted that “the older
generation’s fears and prejudices have given way” and affirmed her belief in
the right to marry regardless of race, sex, or sexual orientation.120 In
Obergefell, Virginia filed a brief supporting same-sex marriage, pointing out
parallels between the rationales offered for its prohibition and those offered
long ago to justify antimiscegenation laws.121 Some other southern states
(including states whose antimiscegenation laws Loving struck down) filed
amicus briefs in support of bans on same-sex marriage, which insisted that
“odious” antimiscegenation laws had nothing in common with laws
preserving the traditional definition of marriage.122 How the Court assesses
these competing interpretations of Loving and the nation’s civil rights past,
both in Masterpiece Cakeshop and the next generation of civil rights cases,
will shape the next chapter in this story of constitutional moral progress.

119. Transcript of Proceedings at 17, Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Va. 2014)
(No. 13-CV-00395), ECF No. 132.
120. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Va.) (quoting Mildred Loving’s public
statement on the fortieth anniversary of Loving v. Virginia, “Loving for All”), aff’d sub nom.
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014).
121. See generally Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14574), 2015 WL 1022690.
122. Brief of Louisiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 24, Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1608213, at *29.

